Abstract and Keywords

This article views public management broadly as encompassing the organizational structures, managerial practices, and institutionalized values by which officials enact the will of sovereign authority, whether that authority is prince, parliament, or civil society. Public management, in other words, is regarded as synonymous with public administration. As for whether or not there is a distinctive public management, there is widespread professional acknowledgement that constitutions, collective goods production, and electoral institutions create distinctive managerial challenges that justify a separate field. Thus defined, the field of public management is surely of older vintage than American scholars have been wont to assert and is arguably even older than the popular starting point for administrative histories.

Keywords: public management, organizational structures, managerial practices, institutionalized values, managerial challenges, goods production

2.1 Introduction

A HISTORY of the field of public management arguably might begin with any of the following statements:

- The contemporary study of public management has its origins in the 1970s: in America, in the curriculums and research of the new public policy schools (Perry and Kraemer 1983; Rainey 1990); in Europe, in efficiency-driven managerial reforms originating in Great Britain and New Zealand (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1990).
The field of public management has its roots in the scientific study of the modern administrative state in America beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Mosher 1975; Waldo 1955, 1980; Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998).

The origins of the field of public management are to be found in the systematic study and practice of cameralism and Staatswissenschaften beginning in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Germany and Austria (Barker 1944; Rosenberg 1958).

The field of public management is rooted in early appearances of bureaucratic government and of administrative doctrines and “best practices” in ancient China and in medieval regimes in the Orient and the Occident (Lepawsky 1949; Creel 1964).

Choosing among these starting points begs two questions of definition: of “field,” together with its boundaries, and of “public management” as distinct from both public administration and private or generic management.

“Field” shall mean, following Bourdieu (1990), “an arena for the play of intellectual forces and power relationships” (Lindenfeld 1997: 5), but in a capacious sense. Evidence of such play shall not be limited to academic knowledge but shall include the “common knowledge” of educated and ruling elites concerning how to conduct the affairs of state (Hood and Jackson 1991). Thus, for example, the requirement of formal training for government service in ancient China and German import of experienced French officials for customs and excise administration and of British models of local governance are evidence of a field. Moreover, although intellectual boundaries have from time to time been narrowly-drawn around the common knowledge of ruling elites, the “sciences of state,” or administrative law, the field now encompasses, in addition to those elements, social and behavioral disciplines that furnish conceptual and empirical footings for the contemporary study and practice of public management (Frederickson and Smith 2003).

As for “public management,” one question concerns whether or not a distinction can be drawn between “management” and “administration.” Numerous attempts to do so, from Fayol (1916) to Aucoin (1990), have variously asserted the primacy of one over the other (to the point of drawing invidious distinctions, for example, between “management” as unduly masculine, instrumental, and undemocratic, and the more holistic and polycentric “administration”) without producing consensus. In this chapter, public management will be viewed broadly as encompassing the organizational structures, managerial practices, and institutionalized values by which officials enact the will of sovereign authority, whether that authority is prince, parliament, or civil society. Public management, in other words, is regarded as synonymous with public administration (Lynn 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). As for whether or not there is a distinctive public management, there is widespread professional acknowledgement that constitutions, collective goods production, and electoral institutions create distinctive managerial challenges that justify a separate field (Pollitt 2003; Rainey and Chun this volume).
Thus defined, the field of public management is surely of older vintage than American scholars have been wont to assert and is arguably even older than the popular starting point for administrative histories: the advent of European absolutism in the seventeenth century. To establish an appropriate historical perspective, however, it will be useful to consider the case for each of the four starting points.

2.2 Adumbrations, at least

The existence of organized bureaucracies and systematic administration in Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, and other early civilizations has long been acknowledged. Though Lepawsky found only limited evidence in early civilizations for “the rise and the development of administration as an art, of organization as a science, or of management as a technique,” in other words, for the existence of a field (1949: 82), that there is any evidence at all is notable.

The field may have originated in ancient China. Confucius held that the conductor of a government should “hold the mean,” meaning “to approach a problem by seeking the widest differences of opinions and by making the most careful study of the facts in the spirit of absolute impartiality and unselfishness, and then to solve it moderately, practically, and logically, in accordance with the best ethical rules,” a precept on which it is hard to improve (Lepawsky 1949: 83, quoted from Hsü 1932). H. G. Creel makes the strongest (albeit controversial) claim for the existence of Chinese doctrines of administration that were influential in later times. By the second century BC, Creel says, an increasing number of [administrative] officials was selected by civil service examinations....An increasing proportion of officeholders were educated in an imperial university that was expressly founded, in 124 B.C., for the purpose of inculcating in future officials the values and attitudes desired by the government. Many of them were career bureaucrats from an early age. (Creel 1964: 155–6)

Creel finds further support for his claim not in Confucianism, which had little to say about statecraft, but in the career of Shen Pu-hai (d. 337 BC), who was chancellor of a small state in north-central China. A book attributed to his authorship was widely read and influential as late as the reign of Emperor Hsüan (74–48 BC). Not a Confucian, Shen Pu-hai “is concerned, with almost mathematical rigor, to describe the way in which a ruler can maintain his position and cause his state to prosper by means of administrative technique and applied psychology” (Creel 1964: 160).

Chinese influence on the subsequent history of public administration and management is proverbial, and not just because examinations for entry into public service originated there. Creel and other scholars find Chinese influence specifically in the regimes of the Kingdom of Lower Italy and Sicily, where Frederick II’s statutes promulgated at Melfi in 1231 have been characterized by Ernst Kantorowicz as “the birth certificate of
modern bureaucracy” (quoted by Creel 1974: 58). As late as the seventeenth century, there may have been knowledge of the doctrines of Shen Pu-hai, according to Creel, and Shen’s book was extant as late as the early eighteenth century. Whatever their provenance, reforms recognizable to modern students of public administration and management were adopted in several medieval regimes (Rosenberg 1958). Of particular interest is the emergence of a concept of “public trust” in numerous cities, “established as legal associations under a corporate authority and vested with varying rights of self-government” that “adumbrated some of the modern ideas of public need and public service” (Rosenberg 1958: 6, 8).

What we know of the history of organized administration across time and civilizations, therefore, suggests that common forms of self-awareness and codification concerning the structures, practices, and values of public administration and management accompanied the emergence of organized societies (Waldo 1984). Broadly construed, public administration and management has been a concomitant of the earliest quests for order, security, wealth, and civilization. Such a view is controversial, however.

2.3 Absolutism and Administrative Sciences

“The modern bureaucratic state is a social invention of Western Europe, China’s early civil service notwithstanding,” declared Hans Rosenberg (1958: 2). These early “bureaucrats,” he argued, were indistinguishable from the household staff of the dynastic ruler and cannot be considered embryonic civil servants. If, with Ernest Barker, we regard management as “the sum of persons and bodies who are engaged, under the direction of government, in discharging the ordinary public services which must be rendered daily if the system of law and duties and rights is to be duly ‘served’,“ (1944, 3), then the emergence of modern public administration and management awaited two historic developments: the rise of absolutism in Europe following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the revolutionary idea of “national sovereignty” institutionalized in France after 1789 (Barker 1944: Merkle 1980). Perhaps the most conspicuous precursor of the contemporary field was a recognized field of study and practice called cameralism.

2.3.1 Early Administrative Science

The reign of Louis XIV characterized absolutism in paradigmatic form. The break with the past was in the growth of large bureaus of officials and a new system of financial administration under the powerful Colbert. Revolutionary change occurred at the local level with the institution of the intendant, a permanent administrator answerable to the king and his ministers, especially in matters of finance, and the intendants, too, required staffs. Against the background of the scientific spirit created by Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, scholars such as Vaubon and Jonchère began addressing the needs of
absolutist institutions (Deane 1989; Merkle 1980). Such scientific thinking (in contrast to descriptive or philosophical thought) “drove the mysticism from statecraft” (Merkle 1980: 141; Raadschelders and Rutgers 1999).

The main story occurred in the German states, however. Beginning in 1640, a succession of German rulers—Frederick William (The Great Elector), his grandson Frederick William I, and Frederick the Great (who died in 1786)—created an absolutist state that broke with medieval tradition by instituting public management by trained and competent civil servants acting on behalf of a “public interest” rather than (solely) out of narrow dynastic concerns (albeit on behalf of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg political interests as against powerful rivals) (Morstein Marx 1935). The Great Elector established public service as a duty to the people (rather than to the feudal nobility) in the army and the revenue, postal, and education systems; Frederick William I initiated the training of officials and established two university chairs in administrative subjects in the 1720s (by end of eighteenth century there were twenty-three such chairs, Wagner 2003); Frederick the Great instituted examinations and a civil service commission. The consequence was the emergence of a field of study and practice termed “cameralism.” (The word refers to the room or place (kammer) where the domain is ruled.)

“Cameralism,” said Albion Small (1909: 591), “was an administrative technology..., a theory of managing natural resources and human capacities so that they would be most lucrative for the prince in whose interest the management was conducted.” According to Johann Justi, one of its most eminent scholars and practitioners, the aim of cameralism, or Staatswissenschaften, is to achieve the common happiness of the ruler and his subjects (an early version of the concept of “public will” or “public interest”) through rules that amount to applications of benefit-cost economics (Small 1909: Lindenfeld 1997). Cameralism, according to Carl Friedrich (1939: 130–1), “was the academic counterpart of modern bureaucratic administration and, hence, in its essence was administrative science.”

As an academic discipline, cameralism amounted to what would today be called a “managerialist ideology” (Pollitt 1990). It advocated meritocracy rather than noble birth, administrative science rather than feudal law, standardized principles (p. 31) rather than local particularity, and formalism and professionalism rather than traditionalism (Hood and Jackson 1991). The best interests of the prince and the people lay in economic development which, in turn required active management by administrators who were trained, examined, evaluated, and held loyal to a strongly led state. Its central tenets are sufficiently modern that Hood and Jackson refer to the late twentieth-century New Public Management as a “new cameralism” (Hood and Jackson 1991: 182).

Cameralists were often successful practitioners. Schumpeter (1954: 143–208) described them as “Consultant Administrators”. In contrast to modern deductive science, “[t]he cameralists proceeded much more by the statement and elaboration of practical maxims than through the construction and logical manipulation of analytical models” (Wagner
Public Management: A Concise History of the Field

2003: 7). Administrators participated at a high level in literary discussions of cameralistic topics and produced a “massive German literature” that addressed general problems and issues of public management (Morstein Marx 1935; Tribe 1984: 273).

Beginning in the late eighteenth century, intellectual and political developments began that were to culminate in fundamental structural change—national sovereignty, Rechtsstaat, the Code Napoleon, the bureaucracies that were to be idealized by Max Weber, and law as the basis for training officials—and to undermine the pre-eminence of Staatswissenschaften as the intellectual foundation for public administration and management. Royal servants became state servants (for example, in Prussia's Legal Code of 1794), servants became officials, government by officials became known as bureaucracy, and bureaucracy became both powerful and controversial.

2.3.2 The Imperial Bureaucracy

With state building largely accomplished on the Continent, “the struggle for legalizing or constitutionalizing these great administrative mechanisms” began (Friedrich 1939: 132). Thus was initiated a decisive shift toward the rule of law and reliance on bureaucracy as a primary instrument of institutional change and social mobility (Anderson and Anderson 1967; Dunsire 1973). Consequently the foundations of official training, academic discourse, and political agendas also shifted, albeit at different times in different states. By the end of the nineteenth century, the field of public administration and management had become preoccupied with the de facto separation of policy and administration and the resulting tensions between an institution, bureaucracy, which exhibited imperialistic proclivities and the revolutionary idea of popular sovereignty, with its expectation of democratic accountability.

The “age of reason” had proclaimed the supremacy of law, and Holland and England (the latter led by Sir Edward Coke and prominent English lawyers) had embraced the idea of law as right reason as early as the seventeenth century. The motive for abandoning Staatswissenschaften on the Continent was widespread dissatisfaction with what was coming to be known as “bureaucracy,” a pejorative term coined by a Frenchman in the eighteenth century (although the term was correctly used by Mill and others to mean “rule by officials”). The historical irony, now no less than then (Morone 1990), is that reforms to ensure democratic accountability actually tended to strengthen bureaucratic institutions.

The French bourgeoisie, for example, finally rebelled against the taxation needed to support their kings' propensities to wage war. “A new conception of the state now appeared in the doctrine of 'national sovereignty'” (Barker 1944: 13). Far from displacing the role of administrators, however, “France retained the administrative machine of the past, but gave it a new motive power” (ibid.). L'état was now the collective people, not the person of the king. Napoleon was, as Barker puts it, the successor to both Louis XIV and Colbert, and organized a new administration around a Conseil d'État and the system of
Préfets nominated and controlled by the central government. The result was that “the Revolution left its new theory of democracy curiously united with the old practice of bureaucracy” (Barker 1944: 13–14). State administration under the Code Napoléon “was to learn to govern France without ever losing continuity through successive periods of revolution” (Merkle 1980: 144).

Following its defeat by Napoleon at Jena in 1806, the Prussian state, too, was quickly revolutionized. Freiherr vom Stein, head of the Prussian civil service, had already transferred official allegiance from the person of the king to the head of state. But prior to 1806, administrative theory was dominated by the idea of the collegium, collective responsibility for advising the ruler. Following Napoleonic logic, after 1806 and the advent of a representative parliament, the collegium was replaced by the Buro- or Einheitssystem, in which, in the interests of efficiency, responsibility was clearly vested in an individual at each level of authority up to a minister. Moreover, the term Rechtsstaat entered the discourse: law as the foundation for public administration. Professors of the sciences of the state “generally held liberal views, such as beliefs in the rule of law, a limited degree of popular representation, a free press, and a vital public opinion” (Lindenfeld 1997: 91). Under Rechtsstaat, these academics believed, a strong, positive government could be reconciled with individual and social autonomy.

In practice, however, the emphasis was placed on law, not on Staatswissenschaften. “[T]he rising emphasis upon law as the necessary form of all governmental action... engendered a considerable shift in the concept of what was necessary for the training of governmental officials” (Friedrich 1939, 133): law, not the administrative sciences. Despite an emancipated peasantry and a liberated townsfolk in a new system of municipal administration, Prussian absolutism endured, as did the power of the administrative class, university-trained and office-experienced. Over time, the Prussian bureaucracy was to become iconic. The sciences of the state, though not bureaucracy itself, were also undermined by the growing influence of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations and the emergence of the field of economic analysis, which shifted the focus of thinking away from the state as the engine of wealth creation toward individuals and entrepreneurs operating in free markets. Thus law—legal reasoning—along with economics eclipsed completely the older administrative sciences in intellectual discourse.

During a century marked by revolutions in the name of popular sovereignty, therefore, the dominant institution of public administration and management became bureaucracy. The dominant idea became the ideological separation of policy and management, the latter governed by Rechtsstaat. Issues relating to management of hierarchies (what are now called “techniques of management”) came to the fore: the content of the education and training of officials at different levels; the use of entrance examinations and apprenticeships; the use of performance standards and evaluations; discipline; reassignment; promotion; salary structures; retirement benefits; status and rights of workers in state enterprises; and retention of personnel (Anderson and Anderson 1967).
This bureaucratic “paradigm” engendered widespread popular and professional criticism. Balzac’s best-selling novel Les Employés imprinted contempt for bureaucracy on popular consciousness. Von Mohl’s definitive analyses tended to fuse the term bureaucracy with a system of state administration that was inherently unresponsive to public concerns (Albrow 1970). For Frederick Le Play, bureaucracy “meant the dissemination of authority among minor officials, absorbed in details, intent upon complicating business, and suppressing initiative in others” (Albrow 1970: 30). Hintze cited the weaknesses of bureaucracy as “corruption and laziness, excessive ambition, servility toward superiors, brutality toward inferiors, conceitedness, and narrowmindedness” (Anderson and Anderson 1967: 183). Said Austrian scholar Josef Redlich, “[t]he combination of parliament and a traditionally authoritarian bureaucracy evoked the worst qualities of each body” (quoted by Anderson and Anderson 1967: 184). By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea that bureaucracy and democracy are incompatible had become popular with the critics of “imperial bureaucracy” (Friedrich and Cole 1932), an idea that has been given new life in postmodern democratic theory.

Rechtsstaat, too, had come under criticism. Earlier in the century, tension became apparent between the idea of a Rechtsstaat and the idea of a eudaemonic welfare state responsible for the well-being of its inhabitants and concerned with protecting civilians against the state (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1999). Later, Stein argued that Rechtsstaat “left no room for a proper conceptualization of administration” (Lindenfeld 1997, 201). In Stein’s view, according to Lindenfeld (1997: 201), “administration was the wave of the future,” a view that found its way to the heart of Goodnow’s seminal American treatises. Later, Schmoller attempted a revival of the sciences of the state in the form of social science, and despite the opposition of many law professors, a doctorate in the sciences of the state was established in 1880 (Lindenfeld 1997).

The dominant intellectual “memory” of the era, however, is Max Weber’s positive analysis of bureaucracy. The power of Weber’s work has obscured the intellectual ferment that preceded it. Rechtsstaat, moreover, had become deeply entrenched and has endured to the present.

2.3.3 Anglo-Saxon Exceptions

An island nation, like England, or a former colony isolated in an aboriginal hemisphere, like America, face different state-building tasks than Continental nations such as France and Germany, where protection of territorial integrity and enforcement of unity were paramount (Barker 1944). The differences widen when the influence of democratic institutions and the nature of legal systems are taken into account. Unlike Continental nations, democracy in England and America was built on a system of common law that preceded and governed the development of public bureaucracies. The idea of the “state” as independent of the political régime, and officials as “servants of the state,” is, as König observes (1997: 217), “still not understood easily in the Anglo-American administrative
culture”; in contrast, the idea of popular sovereignty and public accountability, staples of Anglo-American discourse, are not as easily understood on the Continent (Peters 1997).

Despite their similarities, the field of public administration has evolved in quite distinctive ways in Great Britain and the United States. The reasons lie in the differences between the two nations' constitutions and political institutions. Great Britain is a parliamentary democracy with virtually no separation of powers. The field of public administration and management in the US, and the intellectual and practical challenge of conceptualizing managerial responsibility there, directly reflect constitutional tensions between executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. These differences did not become apparent, however, until the emergence of the American administrative state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The field of public administration and management in the Anglophone world originated in England.

2.3.4 Limited Government in England

After the Commonwealth and the violence of parliamentary power, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 established a monarchy with curtailed powers. While France and Prussia “made a science of the service of the State,” England “considered [governing] a task for intelligent amateurs” (Barker 1944: 29, quoting Pollard in Acton et al. 1902–12: 10. 353). Government in England, moreover, was parliamentary and local. “[T]he theory of the English State [after 1660 and 1688] is a theory not of the administrative absolutism of a king, but of the legislative omnipotence of a parliament” (Barker 1944: 31) and the power of justices of the peace and municipal councils. Whereas the French, for example, hoped to overcome “the intractable nature of the human material” by imposing order, the British preferred to rely on liberty and free choice to produce rational action (Merkle 1980: 210).

A series of developments in the nineteenth century gradually brought elements of bureaucracy into English public administration and management. Various reforms established common patterns of education for officials modeled on classical instruction; “practical technology and organization were considered beneath the attention of a gentleman” (Merkle 1980: 209). In 1853, open competition for appointment to the civil service in India was adopted (and became the rule in British government in 1870). Two years later, following the Northcote–Trevelyan report (“a classic case of argument from ‘common knowledge’ in order to draw (apparently) obvious conclusions,” Hood and Jackson 1991: 141), Gladstone overrode Parliamentary objections to engineer the Order in Council of 1855, which created a civil service commission and required a minimum of competence among public officers” (White 1935: 1). The result was creation of a civil service which has become a model, and in many respects a caricature (as was the Prussian bureaucracy), of such an institution.
None of these developments belied English acquiescence in bureaucratic government, however. English intellectuals compared the bureaucratized Continent with “free England” (Dunsire 1973). In his *Principles of Political Economy*, John Stuart Mill “set himself against ‘concentrating in a dominant bureaucracy all the skill and experience in the management of large interests, and all the power of organized action, existing in the community’” (quoted by Albrow 1970: 22). Herbert Spencer warned that “[a]n employed bureaucracy regularly [becomes] a governing bureaucracy, inflexible, fond of power, but enslaved by routine” (quoted by Albrow 1970: 25). French and German critics of the rigid Prussian system envied English self-government. Nonetheless professionalism in public service has had its effects. Ramsey Muir could argue by 1910 that bureaucracy was becoming a reality in England (Albrow 1970: 26).

The English civil service has enjoyed high prestige for integrity, capacity, and intelligence (White 1935). It has also been viewed as having frozen “gentlemanliness” into “a type of neo-mandarinism which saw government of every type the fit province of the generalist and the classicist” (Merkle 1980: 209). Even though amateurism gave way to professionalism, “not only had England avoided bureaucracy, it had also avoided schools for public servants; and with them, administrative science textbooks” because there was no incentive to produce them (Dunsire 1973: 57). While creating the capacity for self-government and engaging in the study of administrative law, England remained unengaged with the study of administrative science.

### 2.3.5 American Separation of Powers

Textbooks on public administration would not appear in America until the late nineteenth century, when Goodnow's *Comparative Administrative Law* (1893, 1902) appeared. In the meantime, the central issue for Americans was: “Would public administration find a place in a government without a crown?” (Stillman 1982: 6). Still a primary example of self-awareness, *The Federalist* (which Rohr (2002) sees as taking a managerial view), together with early debates over governance in the new republic and early experience with governing, have been distilled into distinct (if not distinctive) administrative traditions or heuristics (Stillman 1982; Kettl 2002): a Hamiltonian tradition, which echoes cameralism in emphasizing strength in the executive to promote national economic interests; a perhaps uniquely American Madisonian tradition, emphasizing the interplay of group interests; a Jeffersonian tradition reminiscent of the English tradition of local government; and, dominant throughout much of the nineteenth century, the Jacksonian tradition of party control of all aspects of administration.

Emerging as the central feature of American public administration and management, however, was the reverential authority acceded to the constitution and to the principle of separation of powers (Lincoln 1838; Story 1840). Since the institution of judicial review was established early in the nineteenth century, the constitution has served as the kind of stabilizing element in American government that public bureaucracies have served in
Europe and Parliament has served in England. But America's separation of powers, and the superordinate role of the courts, also greatly complicated the matter of establishing a legitimate role for “unelected bureaucrats.”

As early progressive-era reforms were beginning to give shape to a positive state, Frank Goodnow stated the problem of public administration and management concisely (Goodnow 1900: 97–8):

[D]etailed legislation and judicial control over its execution are not sufficient to produce harmony between the governmental body which expresses the will of the state, and the governmental authority which executes that will....The executive officers may or may not enforce the law as it was intended by the legislature. Judicial officers, in exercising control over such executive officers, may or may not take the same view of the law as did the legislature. No provision is thus made in the governmental organization for securing harmony between the expression and the execution of the will of the state. The people, the ultimate sovereign in a popular government, must...have a control over the officers who execute their will, as well as over those who express it.

Separation of powers, Goodnow recognized, creates a discontinuity in the constitutional scheme such that the people cannot be fully assured that their wishes will be carried out or enforced. The problem is one of coordination between law and implementation—the central, multibranch relationship in American public management—without creating unaccountable power in executive agencies.

2.4 An American Century

The profession of public administration is an American invention, Frederick Mosher once declared (Mosher 1975). Dwight Waldo’s similar claim, echoed by Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme (1998), was more implicit: “[O]ccasionally throughout history there were training programs for administrative personnel....[T]he eighteenth century Prussian course of preparation for royal service known as Cameralism will surely come to mind....But my reading of the record is that only around the turn of [the twentieth] century did administration attain self awareness” (1980: 64).

The American field's founders were more Eurocentric than is now remembered, however. Wilson, Goodnow, and others sought to adapt European precedents to the American political culture. In his 1926 American textbook, Leonard White noted, in addition to two French journals, that “the most important periodical” dealing with public administration was Public Administration, published on behalf of the English Institute of Public Administration, whose founding preceded the American Society for Public Administration and its Public Administration Review by over fifteen years. The work of Henri Fayol, Harold Laski, Lorenz von Stein, Otto Hintze, Henry Berthélemy, and other Europeans was
Public Management: A Concise History of the Field

familiar to American scholars, many of whom had studied in Germany. Early American contributors to the field that was beginning to emerge there—Cleveland, Willoughby, Dickinson, Friedrich, Fairlie, Pfiffner—were familiar with, and often wrote about, European and English institutions in both administrative law and public management, and many advocated at least selective adaptation of such precedents to the specific needs of America's rapidly expanding administrative state.

Americans have nevertheless tended to see their government, with its formal separation of powers, federal distribution of authority, and “Bill of Rights,” as an exception to European étatism and Rechtsstaat and to English parliamentarianism. Americans regard their own view of democratic governance as unique, even paradigmatic, and their methods of study, especially their emphasis on theory-based quantitative analysis, as more rigorously scientific. The emergence of a profession of public administration and management in the United States and of a productive academic enterprise both within and independent of political science has attained intellectual pre-eminence in Europe (Dunsire 1973, Kickert 1997). The American approach gave legitimacy to ideas and methods that the reigning European legalism regarded as irrelevant (Rugge 2004).

In any event, the modern era, owing much to American intellectual leadership, has brought more organized and detailed attention and a high degree of academic prestige to a continuously evolving field (Lepawsky 1949).

2.4.1 Scientific Management

American public management (not unlike that in Europe) arguably began in the cities, with the bureaus of municipal research and with Progressive reforms in city management (Mosher 1975; Kickert 1997). The nineteenth-century spoils system (which, Carpenter notes (2001: 41), “bore curious similarities to the medieval European notion of property-in-office”) had deteriorated into “political clientelism, nepotism and corruption” (Kickert 1997: 19). Much of the early literature by Goodnow, Cleveland, Willoughby, White, and others was concerned with municipal problems and reforms.

To suit the American temper, which reveres individualism and free enterprise, the replacement for a politically micromanaged public administration, notes Caiden (1984: 53), “had to appear nonpartisan, scientific, universal, efficient, and purposeful. It was sought first in comparisons with foreign experience, then in possible application of selected foreign practices, and finally in conceptualization of general principles derived from observation or hunch that could be elevated into universal laws governing human organization.” The ideas most widely attributed to early American administrative thought, of a dichotomy between politics and administration and of scientific principles as the basis for management, “gave a form and purpose, a self-confidence, to both the practice
and the study of administration in the 1920s and early 1930s” at all levels of government (Dunsire 1973: 94).

“Scientific management,” both as a method and as a body of principles, was embraced because, owing to its business origins, it promised legitimacy for administration in the face of congenital American skepticism of the kind of bureaucratic power associated with European étatism. Writing in 1914, Hamilton Church (1914: iv) captured the excitement of the idea:

The question of formulating some approach to a true science of management has been in the air for some time. The first and most forceful stirring of the subject is unquestionably due to Mr. Frederick W. Taylor, whose paper on “Shop Management,” issued in 1903, opened most persons’ eyes to the fact that administration was ceasing to be...a kind of trade secret, known only to a few men...and that it was entering a stage where things could be reasoned about instead of being guessed at.

Dunsire notes that the term *science* meant “something more than the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers on ‘administrative science’ (or indeed ‘economic science’ or ‘political science’) had meant by the word—something like ‘disciplined study’” (1973: 93).

In 1937, the Report of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (the Brownlow Report), became “a landmark statement of ‘managerialism’ in public administration and is closely associated with the alliance between Progressivism and the scientific management movement” (Hood and Jackson 1991: 135; Dunsire 1973; Merkle 1980). The Brownlow Report (PCAM 1937) brought scientific management to bear on problems at the federal level of American government. The solution to weak presidential control over the burgeoning bureaucracy “is couched in terms of a more centralized top-down reporting structure based on a private business management analogy, with a large general staff apparatus around the chief executive” (Hood and Jackson 1991: 136). Like the Northcote–Trevelyan report, it ran into immediate political trouble, but it had an “agenda-setting” effect in the longer term and “has acquired unquestionably ‘classic’ status....It appeals to the march of history and the laws of administrative science to back up its assertions” (Hood and Jackson 1991: 136–7), although it “no more demonstrates the validity of the measures it advocates than does the Northcote–Trevelyan Report” (Hood and Jackson 1991: 142).

Release of the Brownlow report was accompanied by the publication of the report’s background papers, *Papers on the Science of Administration*, edited by Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (1937) (which first brought Henri Fayol’s ideas to an American audience). This volume served as a lightning rod for critics of a depoliticized, scientific managerialism. Scientific management in a narrow sense had never been as dominant an idea in democratic America as is often supposed (Dunsire 1973), not even with Gulick. Moreover, human relations scholarship, the debate between Herman Finer (1940) and Carl Friedrich (1940)—Finer argued for detailed control of bureaucracy by legislation, Friedrich for managerial professionalism and self-control—and works such as Herring’s
Public Administration and the Public Interest (1936) and Barnard's The Functions of the Executive (1938) established the human and political dimensions of management. Within the next decade or so, a series of intellectual challenges to so-called “orthodoxy”—apolitical, scientific management—was to create an “intellectual crisis” in American public administration (Ostrom 1973) that swept away not only orthodoxy but memory of the spirited thirty-year discourse on democratic governance that had shaped the field (Lynn 2001b).

### 2.4.2 Dissent and Divergence

The end of orthodoxy was savagely quick. Robert A. Dahl (1947) and Herbert A. Simon (1950) argued from different intellectual vantage points that the search for principles was naive and unscientific. Their argument was amplified by Dwight Waldo in his widely influential The Administrative State (1948). Any pretense at unity now shattered, decades of heterodoxy ensued, wherein the behaviorism of Simon, the organization theories pioneered by March and Simon, older versions of institutional managerialism, newer versions of scientific managerialism, the normative manifestos originating in Minnowbrook and Blacksburg (Frederickson 1971; Wamsley et al. 1990), and developments in the social sciences such as public choice theory, “the new economics of organization,” and the study of institutions in sociology, economics and political science competed for “the soul of public administration.” The stakes in this competition rose, moreover, as the agenda of the maturing welfare state presented perplexing new intellectual and practical challenges to public managers.

As Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman have emphasized, communication is a key managerial aspect of American exceptionalism (although there are others, including the tolerance of enormous variation across states and municipalities and the fluidity of the legal framework: Peters 1997). “[T]he American separation of powers means that face-to-face encounters...are actually more frequent in Washington than in European capitals.... Institutions and history have pushed American bureaucrats toward more traditionally political roles as advocates, policy entrepreneurs and even partisans, and have led congressmen to adopt a more technical role” (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981: 243). It was this activist aspect of American public management that provided the pretext for a new phase in the history of the field: the “discovery” of public management by the newly formed public policy schools beginning in the 1970s.

### 2.5 The Search for Excellence and Efficiency
However much one might acknowledge the intellectual depth and historical continuity of the field of public administration and management from 1660 to 1970, something “new” did come into the picture in the 1970s in both America and Europe. Economic crises, fiscal scarcity, and weariness with the liberal governance of preceding decades gave impetus to more conservative political agendas wherein public-management-cum-private-management was viewed as a means, if not a panacea, for a more frugal, efficient government.

2.5.1 “Best Practices” in America

When choosing to complement technocratic training in policy analysis with an emphasis on public management as a subject for research and teaching in the early 1970s, public policy scholars at Harvard, Princeton, and the University of California rebuked “traditional public administration” for having too little regard for the public manager as a strategic political actor (Lynn 1996). The new emphasis was on how to “realize the potential of a given political and institutional setting” (Moore 1984: 3), that is, on public management as craft, an emphasis neglected, although far from ignored, in traditional American literature. Craft-oriented pedagogy and scholarship featured experiential learning and the extensive analysis of cases, with the goal of identifying “best practices” and universal principles, rules, and checklists for effective public management (Bardach 1987). Works that distill managerial principles from case analyses have become one of the most popular genres in the field (cf. Kettl 2002).

Although its largely ahistorical, “institutions-are-given” perspective was controversial outside the policy schools, this orientation, as later manifest in Osborne and Gaebler’s best-selling Reinventing Government (1992) (a spawn of In Search of Excellence, by Peters and Waterman 1982), with its universal “steer-don't-row” prescription and canonical principles, was to prove congenial to a new generation of reform-minded activists, including the practitioner-dominated National Academy of Public Administration and officials associated with the Clinton administration’s National Performance Review. As Guy Peters has noted (1997: 255), “[p]erhaps the one defining feature of reinvention is a disregard of some of the conventions associated with traditional public administration and an associated desire to rethink government operations from the ground up.” Although often regarded as a brand of New Public Management, the American “reinvention” movement featured managerial deregulation, quality, and entrepreneurship and placed far less emphasis on the kinds of market-mimicking reforms that, in any event, had long been popular in state and local government. NPM in America is better represented by the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act, a Congressional initiative, and by President George W. Bush’s “Management Agenda”, which emphasized performance-driven, outsourced management in federal departments and agencies and use of a “program assessment rating tool” in budgeting.
2.5.2 Administrative Reform in Europe

Something “new” was abroad in Europe as well by the 1980s (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1990; Kickert 1997). Unlike America, the awakened European interest in public management was more a political than an academic invention. It was directly inspired by the economic crises of the mid-1970s, although it was also influenced by the complex challenges of the post-war welfare state.

Similar to their American counterparts, some European students of bureaucracy and management sought to repudiate a seemingly entrenched paradigm: the legalistic thinking that had continued to dominate training and practice since the nineteenth century (Kickert 1997). In France especially, owing to the influence of Crozier, Friedberg, and other sociologists, the concept of management public became central, and the Institut de Management Public was created in the 1960s (Crozier and Friedberg 1980). (An awakening interest in public administration in Germany, and such latent interests as existed in Great Britain, were not to bear fruit until later.)

Although the substantive orientation of this new European interest in public management was not toward best practices (the influence of in Search of Excellence is, however, evident in both places), “the appeal of the recent managerialist literature lies in the fact that it has been packaged in ways which have addressed issues from the perspective of managers rather than from the perspective of the theorist” (Aucoin 1990: 118). European approaches reflected more traditional concepts of administrative science and public administration, however (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000).

Aucoin (1990) sees two sets of such ideas at work. The first is a private-sector-oriented managerialist ideology first conceptualized by Pollitt (1990) and manifest in the Thatcher reforms that became the foundation of the New Public Management, which asserts the primacy of management over bureaucracy. In this respect, it is notable that the academic study of public management migrated from departments of public administration or political science towards schools of management, and selected, younger civil servants began to study in those schools. The second, more political, perspective is inspired by public choice theory or its stable-mate principal-agent theory (Lane 1993), which establishes the primacy of representative government over bureaucracy. These two sets of ideas are, in Aucoin's analysis, in sharp tension: managerialism requires a politics/administration dichotomy, public choice theory repudiates it.

The new approaches have been sharply contested. Metcalfe and Richards, for example, argue that public choice “largely fails to contribute usefully to our understanding of real world public management problems” (1993: 115). In König's view, legalistic reasoning may be superior to economic reasoning: “Assessments of effects and successes, analyses of costs and benefits fall short of what legal argumentation is able to perform” (König 1997, 226). The unit of analysis for Metcalfe and Richards and for König is the system as
Public Management: A Concise History of the Field

a whole, not the individual or the transaction. Metcalfe and Richards prefer a network perspective, however, whereas König argues for “the primacy of politics and democracy as well as the constitutional system of order” (König 1997: 228).

The fact that practical, theoretical and methodological issues in Europe and the U.S. have been tending to converge is both cause and consequence of the direction the field has taken since the 1990s: toward a globalization of the discourse on public administration and management and, in a real sense and for the first time, an internationalization of the field.

2.5.3 The Globalization of Public Management

“[T]here has been an increasing degree of cross-fertilization throughout advanced political systems,” Aucoin noted in 1990, “and some considerable spread of these ideas to less advanced political systems” (119). A year later, Christopher Hood (1991) was to coin a term that became a banner for the globalization of public management: New Public Management (NPM). That term was meant to characterize a neo-Taylorite, neocameralist approach to managerial reform, originating with the Thatcher regime in Great Britain and with managerialist reforms in New Zealand and Australia. In a popular interpretation, NPM began propagating itself globally both because of the inherent appeal of the ideas and because of the support of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations, the United Nations Development Program, and other international and regional forums. That is, NPM referred to a simulacrum of the allocation of resources by competitive markets that suited neo-conservative times: managerial, customer-oriented, performance-driven (Pollitt 1990, Hood and Jackson 1991, Kickert 1997). A compact view of NPM is König’s: “a popularised mixture of management theories, business motivation psychology and neo-liberal economy” (1997: 219).

Impressed by the apparently global nature of public management reform and by the family resemblance of its motivations and strategies, academics began creating new international forums for professional discourse on the subject in the 1990s. As König (1997: 226) noted, “management has become the...lingua franca in an increasingly internationalised administrative world. It signals that public administration implies planning and coordination, staff recruitment and development, personnel management and control, organisation, and so on, and that allowances must be made in all these respects for the scarcity of resources.”

Motivations to create and participate in these forums (which, though international, have drawn less interest from the French- and Spanish-speaking worlds, Asia, and the less developed countries), have varied. Some promoted New Public Management as an ideology and sought an audience for positive assessments, however premature. Others were impressed with the apparent convergence of management institutions, practices, and values, even seeing a global consensus that the private sector could out-perform...
traditional institutions (Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998). König insisted, for example, that the challenge of NPM to Continental Europeans “goes beyond the claim to an internal rationalization of the public administration by means of good management” (1997: 213) and posits a slenderized state with well functioning competitive markets. Others sought to promote a wider understanding of national institutions in responding to the managerial challenges of globalization, seeing divergence and the possibility of new theoretical insights to processes of managerial reform (Pollitt 2002). Academics sought a dialogue among scholars with the more modest ambition of encouraging both theory building and lesson drawing among jurisdictions confronting similar challenges (Lynn 1997, 2001a).

Whatever the specific motivations, the idea that there existed entering the twenty-first century a field of public administration and management that transcended national political boundaries was beginning to take hold among prominent scholars, a milestone in the field's history.

2.6 On Wine and Bottles, Old and New

If governments are viewed as bottles, then codified, rationalized managerial structures, practices, and values are the wines that fill them. The configurations of actual wine bottles vary widely, as do their contents. But wine mavens recognize each other the world over, new versions of wines from noble grapes are celebrated, and the discovery of an Etruscan amphora or an ancient Roman bottle is cherished by all. So, too, there is a professional field of public administration and management, of ancient origins, which its mavens across the world do not fail to recognize and whose variations delight, enlighten, and unite its members. As Leonard White said in 1926, “the natural history of administration connects its ancient and modern forms in an unbroken sequence of development” (4).

That there is a coherent and enduring intellectual agenda for the field of public administration and management is becoming more widely recognized, albeit from different perspectives. “All administrative reform, like basically all administrative theory,” argues Werner Jann, “deals with the same set of problems: legality, legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness” (1997: 94). Raadschelders and Rutgers argue that without studying three dichotomies—public/private, policy/administration, and state/society—“public administration cannot be understood at all” (1999: 30). “[A]ll governments,” argue Aucoin and Neintzman, “must now govern in a context where there are greater demands for accountability for performance on the part of a better educated and less deferential citizenry, more assertive and well organized interest groups and social movements, and more aggressive and intrusive mass media operating in a highly competitive information-seeking and processing environment” (2000: 46). Amongst
particulars, in other words, there are universals, although no agreement on what these universals are.

If there is a transcendent issue, it is the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy, between administrators and the people, between managerial responsibility and popular sovereignty and the rule of law. As Riggs has noted (1997a: 350), “[i]t has never been easy in even the most democratic countries for the organs of representative government to sustain effective control over their bureaucracies.”

Perhaps no development illustrates this proposition better than finding Great Britain (much more than New Zealand) at the forefront of sustained administrative reform in the era of globalized public management and Germany a distinct laggard. Not only did Margaret Thatcher restructure and refocus British public administration but, of the Blair government, it has been said, perhaps too breathlessly, that “[a]t a stroke, a whole new central architecture for managing he implementation of policy in England has been created” (Lee and Woodward 2002: 54). From the perspective either of Rechtsstaat or of a formal separation of powers, the fact that, as König notes, “the British administrative ‘revolution’ with its market testing, compulsory competitive tendering, and so on, has turned out to be the most uncompromising” (1997: 219) is arresting. From a German or French perspective, a state that malleable could not provide the continuity that settled institutions have provided (König 1997). For Americans, who, lacking integrative institutions (Page 1992), have always had to settle for incrementalism on matters of managerial reform, such malleability can only be envied.

The explanation for such differences lies not in craft or structure but in constitutions, in national institutional arrangements that establish and regulate the balance between managerial capacity and external control. The British “fusion of [executive and legislative] powers in a cabinet permits them to maintain effective control over an intrinsically powerful mandarinate” (Riggs 1997b: 274; Stillman 2000). In Germany, in contrast, the inclusion of “traditional principles of civil service” in the Federal Constitution was, Jann (1997) argues, a kind of constitutional guarantee of Weberian principles of administration, and only the sudden belated popularity of the “New Steering Model” at the local level threatened Weberian continuity by seeking to diminish the difference between public and private sectors. America’s separation of powers accounts for its exceptional approach to public administration and management.

The fact that public management reform remains primarily a national (and constitutional) matter (König 1997; Rohr 2002) despite the globalization of resources, technology, and ideas is of less significance to the field, however, than that these issues can be intelligibly studied and debated by academic and practicing professionals of widely different national experiences. While their orientations to disciplines, theories, methods, and national agendas will differ (Stillman 2000), these professionals have in common a grasp of larger issues that transcend the descriptive particulars of national regimes or tenets of disciplinary training. National differences may be inimical to reaching that elusive consensus on the universal principles of public administration and management, but such
differences are the lifeblood of scientific inquiry and thus well serve the goal of building the theories and empirical understanding that, as they have from ancient times, sustain a professional field on a global scale.

References


RUGGE, F. (2004), Personal communication.


Laurence E. Lynn Jr.

Laurence E. Lynn Jr. is the Sidney Stein, Jr., Professor of Public Management Emeritus at the University of Chicago, Sid Richardson Research Professor at the University of Texas-Austin, and Professor of Public Management at the University of Manchester.